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Prevent and Tame. Protest under (Self)Control

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»Wichtig ist der Widerstand«: Rituals of Taming and Tolerance in Movement Responses to the Violence Question

Introduction

Whether violence should be considered a legitimate protest tactic has been a topic of heated debate among activists for decades. Whatever one's position on this question, it is clear that the rift between militant and nonviolent factions can severely diminish a movement's capacity for solidaristic action and lead to deep and lasting animosities among activists. While scholars are beginning to theorize the ways in which violence has become ritualized in the dance between protesters and police in most western democracies, activists know that the movements' ways of responding to violent protest have also become ritualized. Whenever protesters participate in »violent« actions recriminations fly about who »started it«, whether or not it was justified, and whether and how disapproving parties should present their views in the press. In an effort to discourage, de-escalate, and/or punish the use of violence as they define it, moderate and nonviolent civil disobedience groups engage in a variety of »taming« rituals, i. e. actions intended to subdue and generally delegitimize other activists' use of violence. These attempts at taming, however, have generally not been successful at preventing the use of violent tactics, and increasingly some movements have begun to approach this internal dilemma in a new way: rather than the one side trying to »tame« the other, they have constructed rituals and frames of tolerance and solidarity that allow them to work together more effectively, despite their differences.

The importance of this issue for many social movements raises a critical question that has so far received almost no scholarly attention: Under what conditions are militant and nonviolent factions able to construct common frames and rituals that encourage tolerance and even celebrate different tactical approaches, and when do they interact with mutual animosity, noncooperation, and obstructionism?

To address this question, we examine the relationship between the autonomous and nonviolence movements in Germany – two wings of the radical left whose identities are critically shaped by their orientations to violence. Specifically, we analyze two instances of interaction between them: one in which they worked together fairly successfully (in the actions against a nuclear waste transport in the »Free Republic of Wendland« in March of 2001) and one where they were less able to resolve their differences and engaged in taming behaviors, including public denunciations and fierce in-fighting (during the actions against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm in June 2007).

Violence in social movements

Relative to the amount of attention it gets in the mainstream media and in activist discussions, the question of how movements resolve »the violence question« has been virtually ignored by movement scholars. The majority of the work on movement violence has focused on ascertaining why people choose violent tactics (Johnson 1997, Wood 2007, Meyer 2004, Grant & Wallace 1991, Piven & Cloward 1977), under what conditions violent protest occurs (Mahanta 2002, Apter 1979, Piven & Cloward 1977, Tilly 2003, Gillham & Marx 2000), and how effective such tactics are compared to more conventional and/or nonviolent means (Hubbard 1994, Kowalewski 1987, Schumaker 1978, Klarman 1994, Piven & Cloward 1977, Gamson 1990). Another line of research has investigated police violence (Sheptycki 2005, della Porta & Reiter 1998, McPhail & McCarthy 2005, Morris 1993, Klarman 1994). In general scholarship in this area has focused on the relationship between an undifferentiated group of protesters (»the movement«) and the police or countermovement groups.

A smaller number of studies have looked at inter-factional relationships within particular movements. Of these, some have investigated the often volatile relationship between militant extraparlimentary groups and more moderate reformists (Ron 2001, Owens 2002, Hannigan 1985). Others have looked at tactical debates within parliamentary movements, such as the split between the *fundis* and *realos* in the German Green party (Ely 1997, Markovits & Gorski 1993, Scharf 1994, Frankland & Schoonmaker 1992, Hulsberg 1988) or between American Black Power and anti-war activists in 1967 (Hall 2003). Others have examined ideological conflicts within individual extraparlimentary groups, although these groups were all dedicated to nonviolence (Downey 1986, Epstein 1991, Polletta 2002, 2005). Few of these conflicts addressed the question of violence directly, however, and more importantly, the result in every case was factional splitting rather than effective coordination.

We have found only two studies specifically investigating the relationship between militant and nonviolence factions within an extra-parliamentary movement. Brooks (2004) argues that the »anti-globalization« movement's preference for participatory democracy and non-hierarchical structure (which he calls a »lack of leadership«) makes it difficult for them to exclude or police violent protesters, limiting the movement's effectiveness. However, because this study was based solely on news reports, treated the meanings of »violence« and »effectiveness« as unproblematic, and left the activists' reasons for their commitment to egalitarianism and non-hierarchical organization unexamined, it sheds little light on their negotiation of the violence question. On the other hand, while Kassimeris' descriptive study (2005) of the conflict between nonviolent Marxist-Leninist groups and militant leftists in Greece in the summer of 1974 shows that the two factions were not able to coordinate effectively, it is difficult to draw any conclusions as to why without a comparative case.

In addition to the scarcity of research in this area, certain assumptions have limited the way scholars have asked and answered questions about violence in social movements. First, the vast majority of authors start from a normative view of violent tactics as necessarily illegitimate, either on moral grounds or because they are presumed to be ineffective. Second, the term »violence« is often left undefined, as if there were some widely shared, nonideological understanding of the term, when in fact contestation over its meaning is often at the core of the debate among activists. Lastly, it is often assumed that there is no rational foundation for the use of violent tactics – that when it occurs, it is because people are being irrational, undisciplined, unstrategic, overly emotional, etc. These assumptions have led scholars (and many activists) to approach the violence question as a problem of social control faced by organizers as they try to keep fanatical, irrational extremists from ruining their actions.

This study takes a different approach, starting from the assumption that those who engage in violent tactics, however defined, are not acting without reason, but see such tactics, at least under certain conditions, as legitimate and strategically useful. If this choice of tactics is intentional and rational, it follows that efforts to control or suppress it that do not address the rationale for its use are likely to fail and/or split the movement. For this reason, we argue that the question of when and how violence is used by social movements is better understood as a problem of coordination and negotiation, rather than one of discipline. From this perspective there are three basic ways in which nonviolent factions can respond to the violence issue: 1) they can allow everyone to participate but try to »tame« those whose tactics they define as violent, be it through persuasion, political isolation, or physical suppression; 2) they can try to exclude the more militant factions from their actions; or 3) they can decide to tolerate tactical diversity and work to coordinate their efforts. The sociological question then becomes: under what conditions do movements pursue each of these strategies? As many of the »newest« social movements seem to be moving towards coordination rather than taming or exclusion (Day 2005, Starr 2005), the goal of this study is to see what factors contribute to the success or failure of this strategy.

Methodology

In examining our cases, we analyzed published statements made by participating activists, archival data collected by the authors, field notes from Darcy Leach's participant observation during the March 2001 nuclear waste blockade (Leach 2006), and Sebastian Haunss' direct observations of the 2007 G8 protests.

Archival data included calls to action, self-evaluations, and debates from movement magazines or websites, as well as a sampling of news coverage of the events in mainstream newspapers. For the Gorleben actions in March 2001 we

gathered a total of 132 documents, including articles and official statements put out by key groups, individual postings and commentaries in movement publications, and newspaper articles. For the G8 protests in Heiligendamm, we analyzed 122 documents taken from the websites of the larger mobilization networks, and several brochures published before and after the protests. We also relied on empirical analyses of the press coverage of the G8 protests carried out by Dieter Rucht and his collaborators (Rucht and Teune 2008).

For both events, we coded all references to protest forms and/or militancy and analyzed them for variation along five general dimensions:

1. Whether and how coordination took place during the *planning process*;
2. How the various parts of the movement and their action forms were framed in the *mainstream press* before, during and after the event;
3. How various action forms and the question of violence were framed within the movement prior to the action;
4. How the militant and nonviolence factions interacted on the ground during the action; and
5. How the various parts of the movement evaluated the events that took place (forms of action, effectiveness, level of coordination, etc.) after the actions were over.

After reviewing the two cases, we will discuss four factors we found to be important in determining whether the movement tended toward taming or tolerance in each case: 1) the degree to which acceptable forms of action and tactical coordination were specifically discussed in the planning phase; 2) whether or not there was a concrete, tactical goal in each particular action; 3) whether or not the groups had worked together before and/or expected to work together again; and 4) the range of ideological, political, and tactical orientations among the participating groups.

Background

There are several important structural similarities between the two cases. Both were multi-day events incorporating a wide variety of demonstrations, actions, and cultural/educational activities. Both involved thousands of demonstrators from a range of institutional affiliations, action traditions, and political orientations. In both cases, many of the activists traveled long distances to participate, the vast majority of whom were not involved in planning the event. As both events took place in Germany, the mobilization process in both cases also reflected many of the particular characteristics of German new social movements, especially those of the far left. And lastly, both were met with intensive police repression prior to and during the event, including house searches, the seizure of mobilization materials, electronic and visual surveillance, restrictions on the right

to demonstrate, and the deployment of tens of thousands of armed police. Aside from these similarities, the two events emerged out of very different movement contexts.

Heiligendamm and the alterglobalization movement

The protest against the G8 meetings in Heiligendamm was one event in a long line of protests against neo-liberal corporate globalization, including those against annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos since 1998, and meetings of the WTO in Seattle (1999), the IMF and World Bank in Washington (2000), Prague (2001) and Ottawa (2001), and of the G8 in Genoa (2001), Evian (2003), and Gleneagles (2005). The Genoa and Gleneagles G8 meetings were especially important points of reference – Genoa for the intense violence that engulfed the protests,¹ and Gleneagles for the dominance of the NGO campaign for debt cancellation and the marginalization of more confrontational forms of protest.

All of the preceding protests had been characterized by the often tense co-existence of various forms of protest, including counter-summits, demonstrations, blockades, property damage, and attempts to storm the cordoned-off »red zones« where the meetings took place.

The anti-Castor campaign in Wendland

The German anti-nuclear movement began in the mid-1970s with massive demonstrations and the occupations of power plant construction sites in places like Wyhl, Brokdorf, and Wackersdorf. In the late '70s the movement's epicenter moved to Gorleben, a town in the rural area of Wendland, in Lower Saxony, where the industry proposed to build a new power plant, reprocessing plant, and waste disposal facility.

Over the next two decades, the resistance, led by a local citizens' initiative, the Bürgerinitiative Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg (the »BI«), defeated all but the disposal site, which in 1995 was approved as a »temporary« storage facility. At that point the movement launched its »anti-Castor« campaign to blockade all transports of nuclear waste (shipped in containers called Castors) to Gorleben. The objective of the blockades was to turn public opinion against nuclear power and drive up the cost of each shipment, in order to reduce their number.

1 Genoa 2001 marked the high-point of violence at these summit meetings. Battles between protesters and police and a police raid on peaceful demonstrators sleeping in a school resulted in hundreds of injuries, many serious, and the death of one demonstrator, Carlo Giuliani, who was shot in the head by an Italian police officer.

Setting the stage: Planning, repression, and framing

The run-up to Heiligendamm

Mobilization for the June 2007 G8 summit took place under highly charged and repressive conditions. Officials undertook a number of measures to reduce the number of protesters and keep them away from the summit location. The police strategy combined a media campaign to undermine the movement's credibility with various tactics to repress mobilization. Months before the summit, federal intelligence agencies and the German federal police (BKA) began voicing concerns in the press about violent protests and potential terrorist attacks (Frankfurter Rundschau 2006). Then on May 9, police conducted simultaneous raids of 40 leftist projects, apartments, and offices across the country. They were ostensibly looking for evidence against 18 people being investigated for »membership in a terrorist group«², but activists saw it as an intimidation tactic meant to both assess and undermine their mobilization efforts. That evening 5000 people in Berlin and up to 10,000 nationally demonstrated against the raids. Another demonstration in Hamburg on the 28th was brutally put down. But if the police had hoped to dampen mobilization for the G8, their efforts backfired, serving instead to unite and anger the radical left, drawing even more activists' attention to Heiligendamm.

Other legal and physical barriers were raised to keep protesters away from the summit. Following the lead of other countries since the 2001 meetings in Genoa, the German summit would be held in a remote location, at a resort hotel on the Baltic Sea. A massive fence – 12.5 km long, 2.5 meters high, and topped with razor wire – was built around the summit hotel to prevent demonstrators from reaching the venue by land, reinforcing the message that the German government expected violent protests. In the final days before the summit, the government also suspended the Schengen Agreement, allowing border police to prevent thousands from crossing into Germany for the event. Finally, a general dispensation was issued suspending the right to demonstrate anywhere within 10 km of the meeting site – encompassing an area twice as large as that within the fence – and declaring any gathering of three or more people within that radius an illegal demonstration.

Planning meetings for the protests against the 2007 G8 summit started roughly two years beforehand. Most important were three »action conferences« held in Rostock in March 2006, November 2006, and April 2007 and several open meetings of the »G8 coordinating circle« in Hannover. Participants included NGOs (e.g. Christian development organizations, environmental groups like BUND³ and Greenpeace, and groups for alternative trade regulations like Attac⁴), local ci-

2 A federal court ruling in October 2007 found these accusations baseless and declared the May raids and wire-taps illegal (Beck 2008).

3 Bund Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland (Association for Environmental Protection Germany).

4 Association pour une taxation des transactions financières pour l'aide aux citoyens (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens).

tizens' initiatives, trade unions, leftist political parties (e.g. »die Linke«), and a range of radical leftist groups, from the more formally organized Interventionist Left (IL), to the loose network of Autonomen in Dissent! Representing a broad range of political perspectives and tactical preferences, Yang (2008) categorizes the participants into three general orientations toward the G8: »partners, critics, and antagonists«. The NGOs (partners) hoped to influence the G8 and the general public through dialogue. The Autonomen and other radical leftists (antagonists) saw the G8 meetings as illegitimate, denounced any form of negotiation, and approached the protests primarily as an opportunity to express their rage and opposition. Standing between the other two, the »critics«, the largest and most diverse group, advanced a radical critique of the G8 while still allowing for the possibility of compromise.

Debates about tactics, when they occurred at all, took place mainly within each of the separate networks (Rätz 2007a). The first Rostock conference⁵ produced a general schedule, consisting of a kick-off demonstration on Saturday, June 2, followed by »Days of Action« and, finally, blockades at each of the five resort entrances. There would also be cultural events throughout the week, and a counter summit mirroring the official summit meetings (Indymedia 2006). Working groups formed to organize the various activities and would report on their progress at the next two meetings in Rostock. Especially given the repressive political context, one would expect the issue of violence to be an important topic for the groups organizing the demonstration and the blockades. As it turned out, however, only the blockade group took up the question in any detail.

Early movement documents from various groups did address the question of militancy, but only in a vague and indirect way. In July 2005, the IL was formed, a coalition that joined elements of the nondogmatic and (post-)autonomous left with a faction from Attac that was more movement oriented. In their founding statement, the IL called for »the mutual recognition of different forms of action and resistance« in the spirit of »constructive cooperation« and foresaw the use of »confrontational action forms like civil disobedience« (Interventionistische Linke 2005). In the Spring of 2006, the IL and a group called »X-tausendmal quer« (XQ), known for their anti-Castor actions, became the driving force behind a new coalition called »Block G8«, which was founded as a working group to organize the mass blockades of the summit. Block G8 met 20 times between March 2006 and May 2007, and in December 2006 they reached an »action consensus«, which became the focus of the first debate about the violence question.

Civil disobedience and militant forms of action

Block G8 brought together people from various backgrounds to plan a common action, including groups like XQ from a tradition of nonviolent civil disobedience

5 The number of reported participants ranged from 70 (Block G8 2008) to 300 (Indymedia 2006).

and some in the IL drawn from the autonomous movement (although many Autonomen groups remained unaffiliated). After much discussion, and despite their usually incompatible positions on acceptable action forms, Block G8 published an »action consensus« in December 2006, stating that their objective was »to practically and effectively stop the Summit and cut it off from its infrastructure« through various forms of blockades. To accomplish this, they promised »to overcome the police barriers; pushing them out of the way, going around them, or canily flowing through them. We will not allow ourselves to be stopped, distracted, or to get embroiled in the police's possible strategy of escalation ... By means of civil disobedience, we will resist by showing solidarity. We do not want to injure anyone« (Block G8 2007).

Significantly, this concept did not commit to a purely nonviolent stance and included the idea that other groups could carry out blockade actions using other means as long as they kept their distance. These other groups would include some from the autonomous movement who previously, in statements advocating »imaginative and/or militant actions« (autopool 2006) or declaring that they would »throw a definitive ›NO‹ and some other things at the G8« (PAULA 2006), had hinted at more confrontational forms of action. Aside from one mention of flaming barricades (NoLager Bremen 2007), documents from these more militant groups remained rather abstract, almost never referring to specific tactics.⁶ Nonetheless, the Block G8 consensus was a policy of mutual acceptance and non-interference between the respective forms of action—specifically, that more militant forms should not take place near the blockades, and nonviolent protesters should not try to hinder autonomous groups in their activities. Block G8 activists later argued that »avoiding an explicit statement regarding the ›violence question‹ combined with a clear non-escalating action concept« had been the key to their success (Block G8 2008, 6).

It soon became evident, however, that not everyone endorsed this policy. At a press conference after the second Rostock conference, Peter Wahl from Attac's coordinating committee unilaterally announced that »all actors, organizations, groups that are part of this process have in no uncertain terms stated that violence will not emanate from them« (Wahl 2006). Other spokespeople immediately corrected him, insisting on the co-existence of different action forms and denying any inherent opposition between nonviolent and violent resistance. Groups linked to the Autonomen argued that asking everyone to renounce all forms of violence would only aid the police in criminalizing parts of the movement and thereby weaken it (NoLager Bremen 2007; Dissent Netzwerk 2007).

Aside from Block G8 and Attac, discussing the question of confrontational forms of action was not high on most groups' agendas. The primary call for action

6 Among autonomous groups, published descriptions of actions tend to use vague language, because police categorize explicit calls for illegal acts as »calls for violence« and use them as a pretext for arrest and/or as evidence in legal proceedings.

from the NGOs makes no mention of action forms (G8 Bündnis 2007). Attac itself was split on the issue: representatives of the movement wing supported the mutual acceptance of different action forms, while representatives of the NGO wing called for strictly nonviolent protest.⁷ Ultimately, Attac did not support the blockades, even though some of its members participated.

In sum, several important facts characterized the situation on the eve of the anti-G8 protests. First, among the more action-oriented groups a general agreement had been reached with respect to the *blockades*: diverse forms of action would be tolerated, and people would not interfere with each others' actions. For their own part, Block G8 announced they would be engaging in civil disobedience and would not attack the police or try to break through the fence into the inner security zone. Second, despite the fact that earlier alterglobalization protests had seen their share of street fighting, no ground rules had been set for any of the week's *other* activities aside from the blockades. It was clear that the NGOs and the more action-oriented groups had different tactical orientations, but these had not been addressed. NGOs and especially Attac had publicly stated their preference for peaceful protests, predicting that »apart from a few paint bombs or stones thrown by the misdirected, no major violence would take place« during the protests (Attac 2007b). In response, radical leftist groups reiterated their call for a diversity of action forms, but what this would mean in practice remained unclear. Organizers may have thought that since no one was explicitly mobilizing for a violent confrontation, it would not be a problem, but it seems more likely that, knowing they would not get consensus on a purely nonviolent position, the organizers simply bracketed the issue in order to keep the coalition together.

After the Castor is before the Castor

Much to the movement's delight, after the 1997 nuclear waste transport to Gorleben, the Castor containers were found to be leaking radiation, and a moratorium was called on all transports until they could be confirmed safe. Thus, while it was not clear when or where it would happen, planning for the March 2001 transport began immediately after the 1997 Castors had reached their destination.

While the protesters had not been able to prevent the 1997 transport the movement nevertheless had much to celebrate: the shipment had cost an unprecedented 111 million DM to push through, and public opinion was moving sharply against nuclear power (Ehmke 2001b, *Süddeutsche Zeitung* 2001).

But the protests had also resulted in a bitter split within the movement. In contrast to the occupations in Brokdorf and Wackersdorf, which had involved brutal battles between protesters and the police, the anti-nuclear movement in Wendland

⁷ Several of the founding members of Attac Germany had been involved with XQ during the 1997 debate over violent/militant tactics. Thus, it is not surprising that, despite their own preference for nonviolence, this movement faction would support the same pro-tolerance position XQ supported in the 2001 Gorleben transport.

formed around a general consensus against interpersonal violence. Within those bounds, however, there were strong differences over the relative merits of sabotage, property damage, and civil disobedience. Nor was the absolute prohibition against interpersonal violence ever universally accepted. These differences came to a head during the 1997 blockades in a way that strongly influenced the movement's approach to the transport in March 2001.

In 1997 XQ had called for a nonviolent sit-down blockade at the switch-station, where the Castors would be moved from the train onto trucks for the last 18 km of the transport. By the time the train arrived for the transfer, 9 000 people were sitting in the road, refusing to move. At the same time, perhaps 1 000 other protesters – mostly Autonomen – carried out dozens of small group actions all along the route, chaining themselves to the rails, building blockades out of boulders, logs, and flaming hay bales, and removing whole sections of track. Local farmers had created a blockade of 75 tractors parked tightly together on one of the two roads from the switch station to the storage site, while hundreds of Autonomen had dug huge cavities into the other road, leaving it impassable. When police arrived to reclaim the road, the Autonomen moved back to the switch station where XQ's blockade was still being cleared.

Tensions immediately arose between militants and nonviolence activists over what kinds of actions were appropriate at the switch station.

To defend the sitting blockaders and divert the police, the Autonomen threw paint balloons at the windshields of the water canon trucks, threw rocks, and set hay-bales on fire. This drew the ire not only of the police, but also many in XQ, who feared the Autonomen would tarnish their image as »normal« citizens engaged in nonviolent protest. Some Autonomen who tried to participate in the sit-down blockade were asked to leave because they »looked like Chaoten« (pejorative: chaotic ones), while others were searched for weapons or had their kerchiefs/masks pulled from their faces. Others near the blockade reported being yelled at, pointed out to the police, or even held for the police as they were being chased. A bitter debate ensued, including personal attacks on all sides and public statements by both XQ and the BI, distancing themselves from the Autonomen. Meanwhile, the media happily differentiated between brave, peaceful demonstrators and »evil Chaoten.«

As these tensions were playing out and in response to the transport moratorium, XQ launched a new campaign, called »X-tausendmal quer – überall« asking people to sign a commitment to blockade the next transport, whenever and wherever it might take place.⁸ In the summer of 2000 it was announced that the Castors

8 By February 2001, XQ had gathered 4100 such signatures. The qualifier »wherever it may take place« meant that even a transport from a German plant to one of the reprocessing plants would be blockaded. The movement's focus on Gorleben had been criticized for making it seem that the activists in Wendland only cared about keeping the waste out of their own backyard.

had been fixed and the next transport would go from a plant in Philippsburg to a reprocessing plant in La Hague, France in mid-October, and the movement immediately began mobilizing for another blockade. A nation-wide demonstration was held in Gorleben in September 2000, and the BI began hosting its regular monthly delegate meetings in Wendland, to which any group could send a delegate. At these meetings delegates debated the issues, exchanged information, analyzed the political and legal situation, and considered various action concepts. Whatever tentative agreements were reached would be carried back to the various groups for consideration. While decisions made in Wendland were not considered binding, if the BI supported them, they were usually accepted by the others. At the same time, because the movement operated on a non-hierarchical, participatory-democratic principle, and many of the Autonomen groups wouldn't allow themselves to be dictated to in any case, decisions generally take the form of »action concepts« that merely lay out a framework within which individual groups plan and coordinate their actions.

This planning process took place within a political context that had changed dramatically since the 1997 transport. Most importantly, this transport was backed by a »Red-Green« government that had supposedly just reached an agreement with the nuclear industry to phase out the use of nuclear power. Most of the movement saw this »exit consensus« (*Ausstiegskonsens*) as nothing but a weakly veiled attempt by the Greens to save face after completely failing in their negotiations. Still, the agreement made it much harder to mobilize for the blockade, because the common perception was that the issue had been resolved.

A second important aspect of the political situation was that the Philippsburg transport was cancelled at the last minute, when France announced they would accept no more waste in La Hague until Germany transported at least one shipment back to Gorleben. Jürgen Trittin, a former activist who was now the Green environmental minister and champion of the exit agreement, argued that Germany was obligated, under international law, to take back the waste it had produced and shipped to France in the first place, that it was Germany's »national responsibility« to let this Gorleben transport through. Trittin's argument convinced many to stay home, and as sponsors of the exit agreement, the Green Party told its members not to join in the protests. The movement worried that every transport to Gorleben made it more likely to be approved as a permanent disposal site. It was imperative that they expose the exit »consensus« as a fraud and show the Greens they would not be so easily appeased. Thus the transport in March 2001 was a decisive battle for both the movement and the Greens. As Jochen Stay, spokesperson for XQ put it, »they want to test us, so let's make sure they get a clear result!« (Vorán 2001).

The police strategy for this transport had also changed slightly. As usual 30,000 police and border patrol officers would be deployed to secure the transport, several thousand of whom were stationed in Wendland 6-8 weeks ahead of time to

patrol the route and to stop and search anyone who seemed »suspicious looking.« Locals and the press called this »occupation« a »totally normal state of emergency« (Gaserow & Maron 2001). But this time the police also had their own public relations team and deployed 130 officers to serve as »conflict managers«, reportedly to negotiate with protesters and manage potentially violent situations. They received a very chilly reception, however. One local woman had this to say about their campaign: »That the people in this region and along the transport route have been subjected to unbearable psychological violence is ignored in these visits. Night after night the racket of low-flying helicopters forces its way into our sleep. Gas stations, businesses and snack bars are populated by armed border patrol and police officers. On the way to kindergarten or to school the children are met by convoys of deployment vehicles. Telephone tapping, criminalization, searches, infiltration, police lies – all of this is our daily experience« (Huneke 2001).

While the »conflict managers« preached nonviolence, legal and illegal repression was intensified. A general dispensation issued by the regional court suspended the right to demonstrate within 50 meters of the transport route, and at the last minute, approvals that had been granted by local city councils for setting up camps within 5 km of the route were revoked by a higher court (Boecker 2001). XQ and the BI complained that the police and the courts were trying to criminalize the movement by portraying the activists as violent, in order to justify both the civil rights restrictions and the police's own use of violence during the actions. For their part, the press made it clear that they expected at least as much violence as in 1997, but they overwhelmingly expected it to come from the *police*. Only two articles in our sample referred to *protesters* as violent. One, which spoke of »1000 violence-ready Autonomen«, was referring to the 1997 protests (Süddeutsche Zeitung 2001). The other was an interview with Markus Mohr, speaker for the »Autonome Unruhestifter« (autonomous trouble-makers), which was conducted during the transport and included a photograph of a hooded, black-clad Autonomer standing on the tracks with a raised fist, with the caption »destroy what destroys you«. Mohr had spoken at the kick-off demonstration for the week of protest. While characterizing Mohr's group as one »whose actions often lead to police interventions from which peaceful protesters also suffer«, even this article is somewhat sympathetic, noting that while Mohr has no problem with breaking the law, his one rule is that »people can't be hurt« (Krupp 2001).

In sum, the political context prior to the March '97 transport was contradictory. On the one hand, much of the public was sympathetic to Trittin's national responsibility argument and believed that the »exit consensus« would soon resolve the issue anyway. At the same time, due to police violence during past transports and the unprecedented level of repression this time, protesters were framed sympathetically by the press.

Old consensus, new action concept

The long-standing and widely understood consensus in Wendland was that there should be »no violence against people«, but sabotage and civil disobedience were tolerated (Leach 2006). The only public reference to this rule around the March 2001 transport, however, came after the transport in a statement by the BI published in the movement magazine *anti-atom-aktuell*. They were very disturbed by comments in two other articles, in which Autonomen applauded instances where protesters had offensively attacked police. The BI chided the Autonomen, noting that »in the anti-nuclear movement there has for years been a common consensus not to endanger people« (BI Umweltschutz Lüchow-Dannenberg 2001).

Prior to the action, however, the consensus about not endangering people was assumed, and a specific action concept was developed and communicated in the various calls to action. The action concept explicitly valorized the notion of a diversity of action forms. For example, the BI's call to action stated that »imagination is called for. Out of diversity, complementarity should emerge rather than mutual impediment. The best place [to be] is wherever there are not a lot of police« (BI Fall 2000). In movement publications, both before and after the transport, a diversity of action forms was mentioned in 14 documents, making it the most common descriptor of the movement's tactical approach. As with the G8, the range of acceptable tactics was not further specified. Since the injunction against interpersonal violence was generally understood, however, we believe the lack of specificity in this case indicated not a failure to address the issue, but rather the desire to avoid being charged with inciting violence (since the police count sabotage as violence).

The action concept not only called for a diversity of tactics, but laid out a concrete three-part plan for their compatible simultaneous use. The first element, the »track concept« (»Schienenkonzept«), stated that instead of focusing only on the last 18km of road between the switch-station and Gorleben, this time the whole route from Lüneburg to Gorleben would be fair game for actions – including the 56km of railroad tracks – making it much harder for the police to secure the route.

The second aspect of the plan was the »section concept« (»Streckenkonzept«) – that this 74 km would be divided into sections that would be assigned to specific groups (leaving some open for unorganized groups), who could then organize whatever kind of action they wanted in their own section. As Jochen Stay explained in a call for action directed at a broad progressive audience: »With the division of the route into various sections, all kinds of tactical approaches can be carried out without bothering each other. This way an optimal complementarity is conceivable, for example if well-prepared people chain themselves to the tracks in one place, and in that way make it possible for a larger group to get onto the tracks in another place« (Stay 2001a).

Delegates signed up for their preferred sections in a closed-door session at a delegate meeting in Wendland, with the understanding that no one would disclose

anyone else's assigned location. In the movement documents we analyzed, the »track concept« was the second most frequently cited positive characteristic (after a diversity of tactics) – mentioned in 11 documents – followed by references to spatial separation between action forms (in 9 documents).

The third provision of the agreed-upon plan was that one area would be open for all action forms, and the various groups would coordinate with each other on site. It was announced at a meeting of the XQ coordinating group in February 2001 that the road between the crane and the disposal site in Gorleben would be an »open space for all groups,« with the provision that all actions should be »politically conveyable«.° After some discussion, XQ concluded that it was unclear what »politically conveyable« would mean in practice and acknowledged the possibility that more confrontational tactics could take place right next to their non-violent action. Still, XQ and the BI tentatively decided to carry out a joint sit-down blockade in that space.

The open space agreement was communicated in slightly different terms in a flyer targeting the broader radical-leftist scene: »The area between the reloading crane and Splietau will be available as a public space for all action forms – the cops, as pre-programmed, will be causing trouble here. At the same time, it is expected that everyone will be very careful that their own behavior must remain compatible with the operation of other protesters. The same goes for the last kilometer before the waste storage facility in Gorleben: here, too, thousands will be trying to come together« (Castor-Info-Dienst 2001).

Although this flyer did not use the term »politically conveyable«, it clearly communicated the requirement that more militant actions not interfere with non-violent actions, which suggests that organized autonomous groups supported the action plan.

On the ground:

Taming, tolerance, and the challenge of coordination

Familiar (taming) rituals in Heiligendamm

The protests against the G8 began in Rostock on Saturday, June 2nd, with an 80,000 person kick-off demonstration. As the two routes of the demonstration converged at the Rostock Harbor, it quickly became clear that avoiding discussion of what forms of action would be acceptable during the demonstration had been a serious mistake. The exact course of events has been disputed,¹⁰ but what is certain is that after most of the demonstration had already reached the end of the route, a battle broke out between the police and roughly 500 demonstrators from

9 Leach field notes, February 17, 2001.

10 See Steven and Narr (2007) for a detailed description of the demonstration.

the »black bloc«. Demonstrators attacked the police with poles, stones, and bottles, police charged into the demonstration wielding billy clubs, several rubbish containers and one car were set on fire, water cannons were turned on the demonstrators, and things did not calm down until early evening.

Fueled by misinformation from the police,¹¹ the press coverage for the next several days focused almost exclusively on the riots, writing about a »new quality of violence« (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 2007), and the television news was flooded with images of black-hooded rock throwers (Herrmann 2008).

Responses to the riots within the movement ran the gamut. On one side, representatives of some moderate and left-leaning organizations resorted to the classic taming rituals, distancing themselves from the violence and denouncing it. Peter Wahl from Attac went so far as to announce that Attac would forcibly exclude violent protesters from future actions (Wahl 2007), though his colleague, Werner Rätz, argued that 95 % of the Autonomen were not involved in the riots (Rätz 2007b). On the other side, the more radical groups defended the rioting. The leftist party, WASG/Die Linke, blamed the German government for escalating the situation (Die Linke 2007). The IL saw the riots as a legitimate form of action that was part of the movement's broad tactical repertoire (Interventionistische Linke 2007), and an autonomous antifascist group from Frankfurt/M. noted that »The promised diversity of action forms – that is precisely what took place in Rostock« (Antifa[F] 2007). The most positive appraisal claimed that in Rostock »[t]housands [had] taken the initiative and ... attacked at those places where capitalist exploitation and the material impact of the global civil war are escalated daily« (Internationale Brigaden 2007). Interestingly, aside from Attac, the DFG-VK¹², (a peace movement organization), and »erlassjahr.de« (»Jubilee«, a Christian NGO), none of the NGOs mentioned the violent protests in their press releases. Nor did the press seem interested in their position on this issue.

After such a violent beginning, protest activities for the remainder of the week were remarkably peaceful. This was especially true of the blockades organized by Block G8, where a variety of actions took place side by side without incident.

(Fairly) smooth collaboration in Wendland

Back in Wendland, the Committee for Civil Rights and Democracy, a national watchdog organization, sent observers to monitor the March 2001 transport from a neutral perspective. Their report evaluated the protests as follows: »The actual level of violence was low. No violence targeting people emanated from the demonstrators; nor did any property damage take place that endangered people.

11 After the riot, the police announced that 433 police officers had been injured. After a leftist newspaper investigated, that number was reduced to 43 left »unfit for duty,« only two of whom required ambulant treatment. Similarly, damages initially claimed to be »in the millions« later turned out to be closer to 50,000.

12 Deutsche Friedensgesellschaft – Vereinigte KriegsdienstgegnerInnen (German Peace Society – United War Resisters).

The police—virtually omnipresent, even when they outnumbered the demonstrators—employed more personal violence: from water canons to truncheon attacks to using painful holds when carrying people away, right through to making arrests« (Komitee für Grundrechte und Demokratie 2001, 16).

While much of the violence was clearly perpetrated by the police, a few activists' reports indicate that on at least one occasion, they engaged in interpersonal violence as well. One account states that »[t]hese militant actions, sometimes also attacking police, mostly happened at relatively stupid points ... [nevertheless, they] showed that there are still people who are ready to do that, and that they have a little more in mind than blocking this transport« (*anti-atom-aktuell* 2001). The BI considered these attacks a violation of the consensus and called for the matter to be discussed (BI 2001). If such a discussion took place, however, it was not made public.

From available chronologies, we found reports of five incidences of interpersonal violence during the transport. Three of these cases were reportedly unprovoked attacks by the police, using billy clubs to clear protesters from a particular area. One of these took place without warning against a peaceful XQ blockade of 750 people; another was against 300 people who were on their way to a registered demonstration. The other two incidents involved protesters actively engaging in some sort of interpersonal violence against the police. The most serious was at the switching station in Dannenberg, during a spontaneous demonstration of about 12,000 people on the night the Castors were transferred onto the truck. It is not clear whether the police or the demonstrators initiated this confrontation, but it is clear that protesters were active participants. Two similarities are worth noting between this situation and the anti-G8 riot in Rostock: both were mass demonstrations in which there was no immediate practical objective, and in both cases the demonstrations had been surrounded by the police when violence broke out.

While the amount and intensity of activist violence in Wendland was clearly lower than it was during the Rostock demonstration, we know that there were at least two violations of the »no violence against people« rule. As we will see, however, in contrast to the G8, these infractions did not trigger an intensive internal debate. Nor did they result in public distancing or cause a schism within the movement.

The aftermath: Taming, tolerance and the question of dirty laundry

Fallout from the G8 protests

The third wave of debates about violence/militancy around the G8 protests started about two weeks after they were over. By this point the hypercharged atmosphere after the Rostock demonstration had largely dissipated. 10,000 people had breached the no-protest zone and successfully blocked all land entrances to the summit

hotel for 48 hours. During the blockade, despite repeated provocation (including a water canon attack in which one protester lost an eye), the protesters had remained nonviolent, and the public image of the G8 protests was now one of peaceful protest rather than rioting.

Werner Rätz and Monty Schädel of Attac were now the only ones from the NGO contingent still participating in the debate. Both still condemned the violence of the demonstrators but not without blaming the police for escalating it (Rätz 2007c, Schädel 2007). The 33 other documents bearing on this wave of the debate came from various radical leftists and Attac's movement wing. Not surprisingly, in these documents the nonviolence groups praised the successful blockades, and groups from the autonomous movement continued to defend the riots but also complained that the movement had missed opportunities for more militant action after June 2nd. Some groups also criticized the Block G8 blockades. The autonomous network PAULA wrote that the moderate character of the blockades implied their »implicit adoption of a criminalizing perspective on militant forms of resistance« (PAULA 2007). Others found the blockades »as entertaining as conformist« (ums Ganze! 2007). At the same time, this sector evaluated the violence at the demonstration more positively. One autonomous activist saw the rioting as the action that most clearly showed the nonconciliatory character of the protests; they were »an expression of our antagonism« (Anton 2007). Another autonomous group interpreted the violence as unmistakably expressing a »radical criticism of the ruling order«, but also complained that the violence question had not been addressed before the demonstration (United Colors of Resistance 2007).

While some kept to the party line, however, there were also indications that many who had participated in the blockades had come to truly embrace the principle of »mutual acceptance of different action forms« and had become more tolerant of the other side. One Block G8 activist (and former spokesperson for XQ) stressed how they had decided not to call the blockades nonviolent, so that those using other protest forms would feel more welcome (Frauke 2008). Some autonomous groups from Block G8 even called the blockades a radicalizing experience in which many activists came to reject the state monopoly on violence (Avanti 2008), or said they had come to appreciate the potential of civil disobedience (Antifaschistische Linke Berlin 2008). The groups in Block G8 were also more critical of the riot. Christoph Kleine of the IL called for an overdue debate on the functions and forms of violence (Kleine 2007) and autonomous activists from the Netherlands reported that many in their evaluation meeting had questioned the appropriateness of the black bloc's actions (AktivistInnen aus NL 2007).

Business as usual in Wendland: After the Castor is before the Castor

Jochen Stay's comment on the actions in Philippsburg in October 2000 aptly summarizes the lesson the movement had learned from the Gorleben transport in

1997: »It's just important that the various approaches have their own free space. Then it definitely works« (Stay 2000). This lesson was applied during the March 2001 transport, and while some activists did engage in interpersonal violence, there was no public distancing in the mainstream press afterwards, and very little comment on it within the movement. In fact, the general consensus once the transport had gone through was that the two factions had worked surprisingly well together. Some Autonomen attributed this to what they interpreted as XQ's having embraced a more practical and less ideologically rigid stance on nonviolence, as in this interview with »Grete« and »Charlie« in the *anti-atom-aktuell* documentation of the March transport: »Grete: You can tell that this time the various resistance concepts integrated with each other very well ... It's in general a very important political point that these small [Autonomen] groups are no longer letting themselves be limited and are choosing their action forms themselves ... On the other hand is the fact that the certified nonviolent activists from XQ have themselves expanded the concept of nonviolence. Pushing police out of the way to get onto the tracks is becoming more commonly understood as within the realm of nonviolent action.

Charlie: ... The split between the nonviolent and the not so nonviolent activists didn't really happen in the praxis this time. During actions it still happened once or twice, where self-proclaimed nonviolent activists pulled others' masks off their heads. Still, the schisms and the fights between the fractions have decreased and working together has gotten better« (*anti-atom-aktuell* 2001).

The »Stiftung Unruhe« also had good things to say about the level of cooperation on site, which they attributed to the »track concept«:

»From the strategic perspective of blockading, we consider the track concept a success. Lively and determined XQ people, engaged activists from environmental groups and concerns, unorganized anti-Castor activists, direct action groups, and a few hundred masked Autonomen cavorted happily on the tracks. Partly in an uncoordinated ›next to each other‹ kind of way, partly it was skillfully synchronized or in agreement« (Stiftung Unruhe 2001).

Conclusions: »Ob friedlich oder militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand«?

Conclusions from the G8 protests

The dominant frame regarding violence before the G8 summit was clearly the acceptance of multiple forms of protest. Numerous statements emphasized that the protests would not be divided by the »violence question«; they stressed the »strength and diversity« of the protests, »diversity of the forms of action«, and the »mutual acceptance of action forms«. Aside from Attac, which was split on the issue, movement actors generally supported this line of reasoning. Most of the NGOs, however, treated violence as a non-issue. In fact, they were noticeably

silent on the question, both before and during the protests, preferring instead to keep their focus on issues of poverty, debt, and climate change.

This frame is reflected in the general consensus that emerged from the three action conferences in Rostock and the meetings in Hannover, that a multiplicity of action forms would be embraced as long as they did not interfere with each other. The practical implications of this, however, were only discussed in the Block G8 network, who reached an agreement that violent and/or more confrontational forms of protests should not take place at the central points of the blockade. The Block G8 consensus held even after the violence on June 2nd, and no group from this network publicly condemned the rioting.

On the other hand, the larger coalition that mobilized for the June 2nd demonstration did not discuss specific action forms or how they would react to protesters' violence, should it happen, a fact made clear when representatives from Attac and the IL made openly contradictory statements in a press conference about the organizers' position on violence. Not surprisingly, these differences became even more apparent after the demonstration escalated. Attac's unilaterally declaring a non-existent non-violent consensus can be seen as an attempt to tame the militants that backfired. In fact, the larger coalition's implicit strategy of bracketing the violence question in the hopes of uniting around a minimal »anti-G8« consensus undercut the possibility of responding in a unified and effective way when violence did break out.

Conclusions from Gorleben

Whereas at the G8 there was no clear consensus about tactics outside of the blockades, the Wendland consensus against interpersonal violence was widely known and accepted. Some Autonomen, however, felt that using violence to defend against police attacks fell within the consensus, and, as the following statement suggests, at least some felt that under certain circumstances, *offensively* attacking police is strategically warranted and legitimate. In any case, they reserved the right to make that determination themselves, regardless of what the delegates may have decided beforehand: »There were also attacks on cops. But of course this is also a part of the resistance and has a role within it. It's not about saying ›the cops say that's violence but it really wasn't!‹ Rather it's that we find that in certain situations it is also correct to behave that way« (Tolle Kür 2001).

Even though there were incidents of both defensive and offensive violence against police during the March 2001 transport, there was very little internal discussion about it or policing of that boundary. This is undoubtedly partly because neither side wanted to re-open old wounds from 1997. In fact, with both sides so sensitive to criticism from the other, there may well have been a general calculation that harping on the few infractions would do more internal damage than leaving it alone would cost them in public credibility or political effectiveness. The movement's own conclusions are perhaps best articulated in this reflection on

the March 2001 transport, published in the nonviolence movement's most widely read newspaper, *graswurzelrevolution*: »Without a broad mass movement, however—which we were able to mobilize this time, despite all the red-green nay saying—an effective resistance is unthinkable. Only through the coordinated efforts of all available forces, be they Autonomen sabotage actions, massive sit-down blockades, people nonviolently chaining themselves to the tracks, or even the Robin Wood people cementing themselves under the tracks, is it possible to achieve the kind of impact that sends a signal beyond Wendland that this is about more than an anti-castor movement. The immediate abandonment of nuclear power can only be accomplished with the whole breadth of the movement« (Markus 2001).

This sentiment was echoed in slightly different form by autonomous groups. All in all, the emphasis on tolerance—captured in the old Wendland slogan that »whether peaceful or militant, what's important is resistance« (*ob friedlich oder militant, wichtig ist der Widerstand*)—was perhaps the most prevalent value voiced by anti-nuclear groups across the spectrum, both before and after the March 2001 transport.

Factors affecting tendency toward tolerance or taming

Comparing the two cases, four factors significantly influenced whether the interactions between nonviolent and militant factions in these movements were characterized by taming or tolerance. The degree to which the issue of violence was directly addressed in the planning phase, whether or not there was a concrete, tactical objective for each particular action, and whether or not there was an expectation of continued collaboration were the most important factors. The range of the participating groups' ideological, political, and tactical orientations was also important, but to a lesser degree.

Face-to-Face Efforts to Reach Consensus on Tactics—We initially felt that one critical factor would be whether all relevant actors were included in face-to-face planning sessions. Our analysis suggests, however, that the more important issue is whether or not the topic is explicitly addressed in these meetings and an effort is made to come to a clear consensus about what forms of action will be allowed during specific protest events. Clearly some of the groups most heavily involved in the rioting in Rostock were not involved in the planning meetings, either because they came from abroad or because they did not want to cooperate with the more moderate groups. But many of the black bloc activists *had* been involved in the planning. At the same time, the protests in Wendland followed a strategy of tolerance, even though not everyone took part in the planning meetings. The problem at the G8 was not that those who broke the consensus had not been at the table, but rather that there was no consensus to break, because no effort had been made to generate one for the June 2nd demonstration. In contrast, the Block G8 coalition had explicitly addressed the issue and forged a consensus for the blockades.

This suggests that if the goal is successful movement-wide collaboration, it is better to explicitly discuss tactical preferences, coordination, and compatibility (and to talk about how to respond if violence *does* occur) than to sidestep the question in the hopes of avoiding a split. Factional splits over tactics may be more likely to result from unsuccessful taming rituals than from directly addressing the issue beforehand. Both in the Block G8 coalition and in Wendland, the question was respectfully discussed, with the goal of finding a consensus that left room for various tactics to coexist without hindering each other, and in both cases the result was successful collaboration, even when violence did occur.

Having a concrete objective—In both instances of successful collaboration, the action had a concrete objective, whether it was to blockade the entrances to the G8 meeting or to delay the Gorleben transport for as long as possible. And in both instances where violence caused some level of internal friction, it took place during a mass demonstration where there was no clear, tangible objective, i. e. in the kick-off march in Rostock and the spontaneous demonstration in Dannenberg. This is most likely because it is harder to tolerate militant action forms when there is no immediate instrumental benefit to be gained.

Experience of Working Together and Expectation of Future Collaboration—Our analysis suggests that the most important factor in determining whether taming or tolerance takes place is whether the central actors have worked together before and/or expect to work together in the future. This helps to explain not only the difference between the G8 and Wendland actions, but also between the June 2 demonstration and the blockades during the G8.

The fact that the Block G8 coalition was able to reach an action consensus had much to do with the fact that many members of the coalition had worked together before, in Wendland and elsewhere, and could reasonably expect to work together again. Their intent was not only to prepare for the protests in Heiligendamm, but to lay the groundwork for a longer-term collaboration. This intention is strongly reflected in Block G8's self-evaluation published after the protests, although the non-violence groups emphasize this commitment more than the autonomous groups.

The pattern is even more pronounced in Wendland. The primary reason for their commitment to tolerating a diverse range of action forms was that the same actors had had such a negative experience with the taming approach in 1997. The whole coalition of actors there has been working together to resist the various planned projects in Gorleben for more than 30 years, and over that time, they have learned how to work together more effectively—coming to understand what offends and alienates the others and what it takes to keep them coming back. Because of the high frequency of Castor transports, they can also expect to be working together in an on-going way into the future, which motivates them to act in a way that will not endanger future collaboration.

In contrast, the broader coalition of groups who organized the June 2nd demonstration had not worked together before and was less action-oriented than

either the Block G8 coalition or the groups in Wendland. And while most of them consider themselves part of the larger alter-globalization movement, the G8 protests were largely seen as a one-time event, and it was not likely that the same constellation of actors would have occasion to organize future events together.

Range of Actors—One factor which we thought would be important is the range of political perspectives represented by the various groups in each event. The range of actors appeared to be broader for the G8 events than in Wendland. On closer inspection, however, the difference seemed both less clear and less significant than we expected.

There was, in fact, an exceptionally wide range of actors involved in the G8 protests. Preferences for certain forms of action differed accordingly, ranging from some NGOs who doubted that even peaceful demonstrations would have any meaningful effect, to the other extreme of some Autonomen and anarchist groups who saw violent confrontation with the police as the only meaningful form of action. It also seems to be true that the difficulty in reconciling these extremes led to a *de facto* strategy of spatial separation—the so-called »choreography of resistance«—which aimed at keeping protesters with different action preferences physically apart. This strategy clearly failed when all actors necessarily had to come together in the same space for the June 2nd demonstration in Rostock. It is also true that the Block G8 coalition included a much narrower spectrum, which made it easier to integrate the different actors into a plan that physically separated civil disobedience from more confrontational forms of action, but still embraced both in a common strategy to disrupt the summit infrastructure. This consensus of tolerance held even after the violence at the opening demonstration, and members of Block G8 did not participate in the taming rituals of some of the NGOs.

However, it is not clear whether the difference in the range of actors is the determining factor in these events. For one thing, it is difficult to tell whether the range in Wendland was really any narrower than in the G8 coalition. The overall number of groups is certainly smaller, but their ideological range—which includes a large contingent of farmers who on some issues are fairly conservative—may be even broader. While our data do not allow us to make any definitive claims in this regard, the action-orientation of the actors may be more important than the range of political ideologies. For example, the NGOs involved in the Wendland campaign (e.g. Greenpeace and Robin Wood) were more action oriented than many of the NGOs in the anti-G8 coalition, and thus fit more easily into the Streckenkonzept.

Based on the cases examined here, another factor which may be even more relevant than either the range of political ideologies or the action orientations of the various actors may be the degree to which key actors are *internally* united in their approach. The one organization in the G8 coalition that was especially upset and vocal about the violence on June 2nd was Attac, largely because they were internally split over the question themselves, and the two factions within the orga-

nization—one more movement oriented and the other more lobbying oriented—had publicly taken contradictory positions.

In sum, we found that the most important factor determining whether the movement tended toward tolerance or taming was the degree of on-going collaboration. Both the experience of working together in the past and the expectation of future collaboration generate a strong urge to choose a strategy of tolerating different action forms. More generally, our two cases suggest that a strategy of tolerance and cooperation *works*, and that taming rituals *do not*. Not only do attempts to control or tame violent protesters seem to aggravate relationships within the movement, resulting in factionalization and weakened mobilization capacity; it also does not tend to effectively stop militant activists from using confrontational tactics. When we say cooperation »works« we do not mean that it stops violence, since activists who use these tactics generally do it intentionally and there is often a wing of the movement that sees it as both politically legitimate and strategically useful. Rather, we mean that movements are able to coordinate more successfully, foster solidarity, and avoid schisms when they can find ways to make multiple tactics complement each other. That said, it is interesting that of our two cases, the one that was the least violent was also the one that was the most overtly tolerant of confrontational action forms. Ironically, it may well be that tolerance is the most effective taming strategy.

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